Comment on Cyber Security:

The idea that a nuclear power plant can be protected from cyber attacks is ludicrous.  It might work for a while, but the attackers only have to be successful once, while the defenders must be vigilant not just every second but every microsecond.  Cybersecurity starts with parts that are not fraudulent, and fraudulent high-tech parts are a multi-billion dollar industry reaching into the stratosphere -- literally: Military and civilian aerospace has certainly been touched by faulty parts, fraudulent parts, mislabeled parts... large companies lose millions of dollars a years to this stuff, and spend millions more to detect it.

Who's to say workers at nuclear power plants are immune from human frailties and mistakes?  Aren't ever susceptible to bribes and blackmail?  Or do they always get it right?  Do they never borrow their kid's thumb drive when they can't find one of their own?

And when the big accident happens, chance are we won't be able to tell what caused it anyway.

Whoever wrote Stuxnet -- probably "friendlies" right? -- unleashed a torrent of responses which mutates every day into something new.  Some viruses are based on the actual code of Stuxnet, which was reportedly very professionally written.  Some computer viruses now have multiple separate parts which wait until the full set randomly gets onto the computer, making detection nearly impossible before the parts hook up and wreak havoc.

The cybersecurity nightmare for all of us is only beginning.  It's one more nail in SanO's bygone-technology coffin, which as pipe-dream after pipe-dream of solving its many problems:  Busted steam generators, nowhere for the used and highly radioactive reactor cores, worker harassment issues, falsified records... and a regulatory agency that thinks they are the perfect guardian of our "safety" to the exclusion of virtually all other regulatory agencies, from OSHA and Cal-OSHA to the PUC and on and on.  Don't talk to anyone but the NRC about safety.  And don't bother talking to the NRC, either, they'll just say, "submit that in writing and we'll get back to you."  When they do, if they do, they just say, "this is not considered of significance" no matter what it is.  It's not like real scientists didn't warn the NRC about the dangers of Fukushima-type accidents at Boiling Water Reactors, or of the various tsunami- and earthquake-induced accidents which could happen in Southern California.  Being able to say, "I told you so!" is no comfort to an "anti-nuke" activist, or any realist, or humanist, or warm body with a soul... a parent, a grandparent...).

Decommission now.

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, CA

Several unsuccessful attempts were made to leave this comment at the KPBS web site to accompany their article on cyber security at nuke plants:

KPBS:federal-regulators-inspect-san-onofres-cyber-security

San Onofre Data and Curves for today's NRC hearing! (2/27/2013)

2/27/2013 9:am PST

Dear Readers,

While listening to the upcoming NRC hearing on San Onofre about to be webcast from Maryland in about an hour (see below for more information), the attached "doc" file may be useful to review; it's the latest from the DAB Safety Team.

Sincerely,

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, CA

Table 1 – San Onofre RSGS Design and Operational Data

Design and Operational Parameters which caused  FEI, FIRV and MFE	U2 RSGs @100% Power	U2 RSGs @70% Power	U2 RSGs @MSLB @70% Power
(1) Reactor Thermal Power, MWt	1729	1729	1729
(1A) Unit Electrical Generation, MWe	1183	?	N/A
(2) Number of Tubes	9727	9727	12,580
(3) Average Length of Heated Tubes, inches m	729.56	729.56	729.56
(4) Heat Transfer Area, ft2	116,100	116,100	116,100
(5) Tube Wall Thickness, inches	0.043	0.043	0.043
(5A) Tube Diameter, inches	0.75	0.75	0.75
(5B) Tube Pitch, inches	1.0	1.0	0.87
(5C) Tube Array	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular/Square
(5D) Tube Index	1.33-1.43	1.33 – 1.43	1.52-1.67
(5E) Tube to tube clearance, inches	0.25	0.25
(5F) Nominal Gap between tube and AVB'', cold, inches	0.002	0.002	0.003
(5G) Nominal Gap between tube and AVB'', Hot, inches	0	0	0
(5H) Nominal Gap, Manufacturing Dispersion, inches	N/A	N/A	N/A
(5I) Tube Wall Thickness/Tube Diameter Ratio	0.057	0.057	0.057
(5J) Average Heated Tube Length/Tube Diameter Ratio	973	973	973
(6) Reactor Coolant Flow (at cold leg temperature), , Million lbs./hour	79.8	78.2	78.2
(6A) Reactor Coolant Operating Temperature (Thot), 0F	598	591	591
(6B) Reactor Coolant Operating Temperature (Tcold), 0F	541	551	551
(7) RSG Operating Pressure (@100% power), psia	892	946	ATM
(8) Steam Operating Temperature (@ 0% power), 0F	531	538	212
(8A) Steam Flow, Million lbs./hour	7.6	5.1	549
(8B) Feed-water  Inlet Temperature  , 0F	442	407	N/A
(9) Feedwater Flow, Million lbs./hour	7.6	5.1	33.8* to Environment in 3-5 Minutes
(10) Steam Quality, %	90%	36%	> 90%
(11) Void Fraction, %	98.5%	92.6%	100%
(11A) Maximum  Gap  Fluid Velocity, feet/second	25.1	12.6	> 50
(11B )Secondary fluid density, lbm/cubic feet	7	12	< 7
(12) Reactor Coolant Volume, ft3	2003	2003	2003 to Environment in 3-5 Minutes
(13) Circulation Ratio	3.3	4.9	0
(13A) Down-comer  Feed-water Flow, Mlbs./hour	24.8	24.8	0
(14) Delta Te = (TS, 6A) – (TSAT, 7A) , 0F	67	53	~400
Fluid Elastic Instability	NO	NO	YES (Film Boiling) Significant Radiation
Flow-induced Random Vibration	YES	YES	YES
Mitsubishi Flowering Effect	YES	NO	YES
Flashing Feedwater Jet Impingement Forces on Tubes	NO	NO	YES

Compilation of data based on Publicly Available Documents (e.g., Westinghouse Operational Assessment, SCE Unit 3 Root cause Evaluation, http://www.efunda.com/materials/water/steamtable_sat.cfm, etc.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Film_boiling

_{Figure 1 – Vibrations amplitude as a function of flow pitch velocity for a flexible cylinder in a rigid cluster (taken from Pettigrew et al. 1991). The cylinder is free to vibration in the cross-flow direction.}

Reference: Violette, R., Pettigrew, M.J., Mureithi, N.W. (2006). Fluidelastic Instability of an Array of Tubes Preferentially Flexible in the Flow Direction Subjected to Two-Phase Cross Flow. Transactions of the ASME. Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, 128(1), p. 148-159. 

=======================================================

From: Martha Sullivan <marthasullivan@mac.com>
Subject: Reminder: TODAY 10a-1p PST, NRC Mtg w/ SoCal Edison on Restart of San
Onofre/Web- and Audio-cast Available

Reminder: TODAY 10a-1p PST, NRC Mtg w/ SoCal Edison on Restart of San Onofre. Telephone Bridge and Webcast from Mtg in Rockville MD Available. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's review of Southern California Edison's (SCE's) October 3,2012, response to the NRC's March 27, 2012, Confirmatory Action Letter for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2. The NRC staff issued Requests for Additional Information (RAls) to SCE on December 26, 2012, and February 1, 2013 (the latter RAI included proprietary information). This meeting will include discussions on the licensee's responses to the RAls, the status of any outstanding questions from those RAls, and any additional questions issued by the NRC staff prior to the meeting.

This is a Category 1 Meeting. The public is invited to participate in this meeting and will have one or more opportunities to communicate with the NRC after the business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned. Proprietary information may be discussed during the meeting. These discussions will be deferred to the end of the meeting, which will be closed to members of the public who have not been granted access to the

Interested members of the public can participate in this meeting via Webcast link or toll-free audio teleconference. The Webcast link can be accessed at: http://video.nrc.gov . This link to the NRC webcast page will permit the user to select the meeting to be viewed and the viewing speed. The meeting link will become active approximately one hour prior to meeting start. The teleconference bridge number is 888-677-3916; passcode 8530507. Callers will initially be placed in a "listen only" status. At the designated point in the agenda, two­ way calling will be enabled, so that the public may ask questions of the NRC staff regarding the meeting discussions.