Tuesday, March 24, 2026

We will haunt humanity forever with the nuclear waste we produce today.

by Ace Hoffman
March 24, 2026

The main end-product of nuclear power — its reason for existence — is to create incredibly toxic nuclear waste, known as Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). Electricity is just a by-product. If electricity was the main product created by nuclear power plants, no one would use nuclear power: Its electricity is too expensive, too dirty, and far too risky (hence, the Price-Anderson Act, a betrayal of the common citizen's right to compensation for harm done by industrial accidents).

Pro-nukers call their hobby-horse "green energy" by ignoring the environmental damage of the whole nuclear fuel cycle, the environmental cost of accidents, and especially the unsolved (and unsolvable) problem of nuclear waste.

Time has proven accidents are inevitable, as predicted from the beginning by those who studied such things.

And physics and chemistry have proven the waste problem unsolvable, also as predicted from the beginning of the nuclear age by those who studied such things.

And thus, communities around the world have become de facto nuclear waste dumps.

The electricity produced by nuclear power can easily be replaced with cleaner, cheaper, safer alternatives. So what's so valuable about nuclear waste?

A small fraction of SNF is the isotope Plutonium-239, which is considered a valuable commodity by some very aggressive nations (including mine) because it can make a very "good" bomb (That is to say: A Plutonium bomb (like the one used in Nagasaki) can make a huge explosion that leaves a legacy of poison afterwards, that kills and maims uninvolved humans (and other living things) that weren't even near (and/or weren't even born) when the bomb exploded somewhere, a bomb that violates all limits of civility to use against anyone. That kind of "good".)

Because of its radioactivity, Pu-239 is so toxic that a nearly-invisible speck barely the size of a pepper flake, if diabolically or accidentally deposited in a human lung, would be almost guaranteed to cause lung cancer.

On the other hand, there is no known minimum dose that is guaranteed to be safe (Radiation is generally accepted to have a "Linear, No Threshold" (LNT) health effect).

How many bombs does a country need? Certainly not MORE than we have ready for delivery by air, land, and sea already (thousands)!

The problem is that as a nuclear bomb ages, sitting unused year after year, it become less effective and more likely to just fizzle when finally used, thus becoming a "dirty bomb" (i.e., a radioisotope dispersal device). Nasty, but not what bombs are "good" for.

Making new Plutonium bomb cores (known as "pits") is very expensive, and requires SNF, because that's the only place in the world (besides older pits) you can get Pu-239. All Plutonium is man-made in nuclear reactors and needs significant processing before it can be used in a bomb. That's dirty, expensive and difficult, but not insurmountable for any large country. Processing is much harder for a terrorist organization; they would probably prefer to steal Plutonium after it's been processed.

So forget the idea that nuclear power is green. It's not. It exists just to manufacture Plutonium.

OF COURSE there are many truly clean alternatives for making electricity (wind, wave, solar, geothermal, heat pumps, water wheels, etc.). Nuclear power is far too prone to sudden failure, causing costly temporary or long-term outages (or worse: meltdowns). Nuclear is far too susceptible to sabotage, terrorism, natural phenomena, improper training or inattention, manufacturing errors, and war. And it's far too centralized to be reliable (when one reactor goes down, a million homes suddenly need an alternative power source). It's also far too slow to respond to population shifts, let alone the sudden build-out needed for temporary bubbles (I'm looking at you, AI).

Whenever and wherever nuclear power is used, the whole world is left with the waste. Our descendants a thousand generations from now will still be dealing with OUR waste one way or another (either in their environment (YUK!) or still trying to keep it away from humanity — something that the nuclear industry says they'll do, but truly has never done (because, truly, it's impossible).

"Consent-based siting" and/or "interim storage" prior to whatever permanent solution they claim might happen (some day) is often promoted as a way to move the SNF "waste" away from locations that are particularly dangerous due to factors such as nearby population density, earthquake risk, danger to groundwater, rising sea-levels, and extreme weather events such as tornadoes.

But virtually all discussions about finding a safer storage method and/or location ignore a simple reality: If we continue to produce nuclear waste (about 50 tons per day globally, 10 tons in the U.S. alone (plus military waste), then even if we "solve" today's waste problem, we'll have the same problem tomorrow!

Unused nuclear fuel pellets made from natural Uranium are only slightly radioactive, and comparatively, have very few fission products, and no Plutonium at all. So-called "commercial" (highly subsidized, poorly insured) nuclear reactors each produce an average of several hundred of pounds of unmanageable, highly toxic nuclear waste every day, starting the moment they "go critical" the first time, because the same process in a nuclear reactor that produces heat to boil water also creates radioactive fission products (created when heavy atoms are split) and activation products (created when stray neutrons are captured by other heavy atoms).

Protecting humanity from nuclear waste has proven to be an unsolvable problem. It's not just hard to solve, it's impossible — due to the laws of chemistry, physics, geology, health and human nature! Any so-called "safe" solution has been utterly elusive because nuclear waste is an extremely complex problem that has technical, political, military, humanitarian, and economic difficulties, to name just a few.

This is exactly why every piece of proposed nuclear waste legislation brings up the same solutions that have been suggested (in one form or another) for nearly a century: Because trying to do the impossible is both very difficult and very expensive.

Problems start right at the beginning: Every city between the current waste dump (such as a nuclear reactor site) and the proposed interim waste site will rightfully complain about dozens, hundreds, or thousands of toxic trips through their location. That's a lot of complainers!

Attempts to make SNF transportation "safer" present impossible tradeoffs. For example, "thick-walled" canisters and "transportable" canisters are incompatible requirements: There are weight and size restrictions for every bridge in America, so thicker canister sides means fewer fuel assemblies per canister inside them, which means more trips per site. Each trip has security risks as well as risks from bridge failures, tunnel fires, rolling down the side of a mountain... an endless list of risks, including avoiding major population centers "just in case" (or maybe just to avoid being told "no way, don't go there" which happens whenever people find out nuclear waste will be transported through their town or city).

There are many potential catastrophic event scenarios for SNF which have no possible solution, not on the horizon, not on the drawing boards, not at any price, which is why discontinuing the manufacture of nuclear waste is the only reasonable solution. Until we do that, an interim storage location might be useful at some point, but if operating such a storage location convinces society to continue using nuclear power — or worse: enables expanding its use — then creating an interim storage location should be considered an utter failure!

In America, any proposed nuclear waste site will be on Native American land because it's all Native American land.

A humble suggestion: Offer the destination state a deal: The source state agrees to stop making more nuclear waste forever, so it's a final solution to a huge problem.

Of course, that won't be enough incentive, so the source state will need to also offer the state taking the waste a bribe — oops, I mean pay the destination state "rent" for taking the waste "temporarily".

Still doesn't sound like a good deal? Of course not! Perhaps the source state should agree to pay these bribes, sorry: storage fees as long as the waste remains at the "interim" storage site in another state, even if it's a long, long time.

But pay who, for what? Pay local residents so they never have to work? If they move away will the payments (bribes) stop?

And what if the "donor" state breaks its promise to never make more nuclear waste? Will it take back the waste another state already accepted? Not likely!

And how do we define "consent" anyway? People living within X number of miles of the proposed site? (Good luck with that!) But accidents can spread globally.And the worst types of accidents — spent fuel fires — although very unlikely, are extremely hazardous if they do happen. They can't be put out with water — although getting close enough to put water on a spent fuel fire wouldn't be very easy anyway.

Who gets to vote (to consent) to have a waste site? Each household within a few blocks? Within ten miles (like an evacuation zone for nuclear reactors)? 50 miles? The same payment for every person? A distance-based payment? Woman and children are much more vulnerable to radioactivity than adult males — do they get extra votes on whether they want a nuclear waste dump, and higher payments if they choose to have one? Can children vote on the world they want to live in?

What percentage of the voting pool has to approve the site? Do newborns get immediate payments? Will pregnant women and young girls be banned from the area just in case there is an accident? Will they be evacuated first since they are the most vulnerable?

The federal government proposes to pay for any and all potential interim storage solutions by robbing the Nuclear Waste Fund -- which exists to pay for a permanent solution. They especially like to rob the interest on the fund, which is the only thing that keeps the fund from depreciating in real value as inflation rises.

If a "permanent" federal repository existed, or was planned, then no one would feel that interim sites would be worth the additional risks entailed by moving the waste an extra time (since every move is risky), let alone going through the political hassles described above.

So why can't America find a permanent nuclear waste dump site? Let's look at what really happened last time we tried in earnest (or sort of in earnest): The Yucca Mountain project, which was started in 1983... became the only site to be considered in 1987... and was halted permanently by President Obama in 2010.

People often dismiss the failure of Yucca Mountain as political. Indeed, there was strong political opposition to it in Nevada -- but there was strong support for it in many other states.

Many people worried about transportation risks, and about enabling the production of even more nuclear waste if Yucca Mountain was opened (since it was only expected to hold about as much waste as already existed at the time).

But none of THOSE concerns were going to stop it.

The real problem was that there were more than 300 technical problems with the site that still had not been resolved when they gave up trying! Some of the unresolved issues (such as water intrusion) were never going to be solved. Titanium shields a half a foot thick? That might have worked...for a while...maybe. But that leaves 299+ other problems.

Claiming that Yucca Mountain was canceled due to "strong political opposition" is just the excuse for the fact that there is NO safe solution anywhere. The thousands of scientists working on Yucca Mountain were allowed to advocate for technically better solutions. The only thing that was off the table was doing basically the same thing somewhere else. The scientists looked at rocketing the waste into space and many other ridiculous solutions, as well as several that were at least somewhat more plausible than flying expensive, polluting and unreliable rockets through a man-made (mostly) debris field already orbiting earth.

A lot of people call for "hardened" storage of nuclear waste. That can mean a lot of things, but nothing it might mean is likely to be "hardened" against various kinds of modern missiles, large airplane strikes, asteroids that find their way to earth... the list is actually very long! Only deep underground storage can protect against those things, but if anything goes wrong underground, there may be no way to do anything about it. A large number of incredibly strong buildings is the next best thing, with the significant advantage that the waste can be monitored.

Lastly, it is possible to use lasers to actually fission the U-235 and Pu-239, but it has not been done at scale, and more importantly, the nuclear industry doesn't WANT to destroy those isotopes, and the nuclear weapons industry doesn't want to either. But it's the best thing for humanity!

Humanity needs to stop making more nuclear waste. There's never, ever going to be a safe solution to all the problems it creates.

Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA

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Contact information for the author of this newsletter:

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company



Sunday, March 22, 2026

Piketon Ohio plan for nuclear and fossil fuel plants to power AI data centers

By Sharon and Ace Hoffman
March 22, 2026

Beginning in the 1950s, the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon Ohio enriched uranium, first just for nuclear weapons and then also for nuclear reactors. As a result, many areas on and around the site are heavily contaminated with radioactivity and other pollutants. The plant itself is a Superfund site.

Nevertheless, there are now plans to install nearly 200 gas turbines, a "blue hydrogen" plant, an enormous AI data center, and an unspecified number of "Small Modular Reactors" (two to begin with, many more to follow) at the Portsmouth site. (Small Modular Reactors are usually abbreviated SMR, we'll use the more appropriate SMNR (Small Modular Nuclear Reactor) here.)

Why at Portsmouth? Why now?

One reason seems obvious: Since the site is already highly contaminated, "routine" releases of radioactivity from the SMNRs will be difficult to track. Even significant radiation releases will disappear among variations in contamination levels from one acre to another in and around the nearly six square-mile site. (And DOE site "clean-up" sometimes means little more than putting more soil or concrete on top of contaminated soil or concrete.)

Who could ever prove that their cancer or their child's birth defect was the result of a new accident, the original contamination, last century's nuclear weapons testing, or something else entirely? What is happening in Piketon, Ohio follows a pattern of proposing SMNRs and AI data centers together in places that already have existing nuclear contamination. For example, there are plans to build AI data centers and SMNRs at the Hanford site in Washington state and at two closed nuclear plant sites: Palisades in Michigan and Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania (both locations are also trying to reopen their old reactor (not the one that melted down at TMI, the one that hasn't...yet)).

Every operating or decommissioned nuclear power plant has something advocates of SMNRs and data centers both need: Connections to the electrical grid. They also have a pre-contaminated environment that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to separate the old pollution and health effects from any new pollution and health effects.

In Parsons, Kansas, a company that has never built a nuclear reactor plans to install an experimental SMNR a mile underground in a industrial park on a former weapons production site. The company lists data centers as one of its targeted industries. When the reactor stops running (expected in less than a decade of use) they plan to simply leave it in place, and put another one directly above it, and then another... And if there's an accident? There's NO plan for that (other than to pour some concrete down the hole and walk away). The Parsons plan is moving forward rapidly under new Department of Energy (DOE) regulations that bypass the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state and local regulatory agencies. The developer and the DOE claim that the SMNR at Parsons will go critical in July of this year (2026) -- less than eight months after the surprise announcement of the plan and only five months after digging began. Obviously, it's unlikely to actually happen that fast, but they received lots of money from the DOE anyway just for saying they'd try.

Nuclear power plants and nuclear waste repositories have always been potential military and terrorist targets. AI data centers ramp the threat up exponentially. In the first few weeks of the current war against Iran, at least three data centers have been attacked already. Even countries that obey global conventions for protecting civilian infrastructure (such as energy centers, water pumping and desalination plants, hospitals, schools, global heritage sites, dams and so on) may feel "obliged" to attack data centers, even if there are SMNRs there. Terrorists may attack them *because* the SMNRs are there. And since America no longer obeys such conventions, morality, or international laws, there is no reason to think any of our enemies in the future will if/when they attack us (with weapons we can't even imagine today, just as drone swarms were unimaginable just a few years ago).

Proposals to put SMNRs deep underground may sound good for security against war, terrorism and other threats. But it has many additional risks and problems of its own. Nuclear power has no future in a world constantly at war. Thus, it has no future on earth. References:

Jason Salley's excellent article covers the history and potential future of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site:https://sciotovalleyguardian.com/2026/03/20/piketon-set-to-become-ground-zero-for-new-energy-megasite/

Citizens in Kansas have established the Prairie Dog Alliance to inform citizens about the plans to build SMNRs in Parsons: https://peaceworkskc.org/parsons-residents-express-concerns-at-prairie-dog-alliance-public-meeting/

World Nuclear News describes the plan for an underground SMNR in Parsons, Kansas: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/deep-fission-begins-drilling-first-data-acquisition-well



Contact information for the author of this newsletter:

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company



Monday, March 2, 2026

Book Review: The Nuclear Age by Serhii Plokhy (2025)

The Nuclear Age, Copyright 2025 by Serhii Plokhy

Reviewed by Sharon and Ace Hoffman

"The Nuclear Age" by Serhii Plokhy presents a fresh look at the history of how we got where we are today, and with seemingly perfect timing, the analysis Plokhy applies is chillingly relevant to current world events (March, 2026).*

Less than a hundred years ago, with the horrors of the first global conflict still in many people's memories -- and as another World War was fomenting -- scientists became aware of the fundamental forces in nature that make an atomic bomb possible (underlying forces that hold sub-atomic particles together -- and that can break them apart).

Political and scientific discussions regarding the theoretical possibility of making atomic bombs began in Germany, Japan (a little) and in the Soviet Union, as well as among Allied "Western" countries. Once the Western Allies (specifically the US, UK and Canada) began collaborating, along with refugee scientists from several other countries, the winner of the "race" to develop The Bomb was already won.

How long it would take, how big a task it would be, how big an explosion it would be (and whether it would be successful at all) were questions still left unanswered, but international collaboration was the winning ticket. (Russia eventually solved its own bomb development problems by stealing the results of the Allies' work.)

President Roosevelt's 1939 decision to provide $6,000 in initial research funding (equal to about $140,000 in 2026) was based on a letter written to him by Albert Einstein at the request of Leo Szilard. As Plokhy explains, despite Einstein's eminence and the potential gravity of his words, it nevertheless would take more than two years (until November 1941), as well as lots of research, and both scientific and political negotiations, before Roosevelt provided significant funding to start what became known as the Manhattan Project.

The ball was rolling...

Plokhy shows how *all* subsequent nuclear ambitions around the world were/are the inevitable result of how it started: Forged in the desperation of war, nuclear weapons and their necessary companions (i.e., nuclear reactors and other components of the nuclear fuel cycle) never really left the military world to become entirely — or even partially — "civilian." They cannot be separated: The support system is vital to having nuclear weapons, is politically too powerful, economically too large, and most importantly: Too vulnerable.**

The historical content of the book covers many aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation and control, including:

  • Why some countries continue to insist that they need nuclear weapons.
  • Why and how some countries, such as Ukraine and South Africa, have been persuaded to give up their nuclear weapons (and how it's worked out for those countries).
  • How everything -- from domestic and international priorities, to personal relationships between world leaders, to activism at home and abroad — influences nuclear proliferation and arms negotiations.
  • How nuclear weapons nations (including the United States) got their weapons, and...
  • How various nations claimed their nuclear reactors were only being built for civilian purposes but in fact were a cover for a nuclear bomb program.
Plokhy discusses both horizontal (across countries) and vertical (within a country) proliferation of nuclear weapons. Vertical proliferation includes delivery mechanisms such as missiles, aircraft, and submarines as well as numbers of nuclear weapons.

Plokhy considers what we might be able to learn from all the non-proliferation negotiations since 1945, and points out that the planet is in the midst of yet another nuclear arms race, but this time without ANY active nuclear arms agreements.

In the early years of the nuclear age, Soviet negotiators were strongly in favor of international control of nuclear technology, but once the Soviet Union sufficiently built up their nuclear arsenal, they lost any interest in reducing their stockpiles below the point of Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.). Similarly, China advocated international controls until they built their first nuclear bomb in 1964.

Britain and France both built their first atomic bombs because their politicians feared their countries would be relegated to second-class status if they purchased bombs from America. Scientists from both countries had made many of the discoveries that contributed to the U.S. bomb program.

Similar concerns led India and North Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons programs by leveraging "civilian" nuclear reactor technology and expertise provided by the existing nuclear powers. Other countries (notably Ukraine) gave up their nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees.

The Nuclear Age shows that previous nuclear arms agreements never actually provided any safety because even a single rogue group can initiate worldwide disaster. Defense against small groups of terrorists armed with nuclear weapons is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

In the epilogue, Plokhy explains that Russia's seizures of nuclear plants in Ukraine should make the idea of nuclear power plants as dirty bombs (which has been known since the first nuclear reactors were built) impossible to ignore. He concludes with the frightening idea that the only common factor in nuclear negotiations is "fear of nuclear annihilation."

The Nuclear Age is highly recommended for its up-to-date information and its broad perspective on nuclear proliferation. All too often, the nuclear arms race has been discussed from a nationalistic vantage point. Plokhy makes it clear that the problem impacts all nations and is far more complex than "merely" technical or military considerations: it is intertwined with politics, financial considerations, government secrecy, false hopes, and wild promises.

Anybody who wants to understand the current dangers needs to consider the broader historical worldwide context of nuclear proliferation, and the many failed attempts to regulate nuclear technology. Plokhy's look back at the history of the nuclear problem and his analysis of past and current dangers is a good place to start. Sharon and Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA

* On January 27, 2026 the Union of Concerned Scientist's famous "Doomsday Clock" was set at 85 seconds to midnight -- closer than ever before, even during the Cold War. (In 1949 the clock was first officially set, to 3 minutes to midnight in response to the first Soviet bomb.)

And things continue to worsen: On February 28, 2026 the world woke up to a conflict involving two known/assumed nuclear powers (the United States and Israel) in a war with Iran, a country that has often been accused (without indisputable proof) of nuclear ambitions. As we write this, the risk of expansion of the conflict is very high. Nobody can ignore the possibility that this war may become nuclear -- either directly through the use of nuclear weapons or through widespread radioactive contamination resulting from the destruction of nuclear facilities anywhere in the region: Nuclear carriers, nuclear reactors, nuclear reprocessing facilities... and maybe who-knows-what.

** See Zaporazhzhia, or Chernobyl, or any reactor that is potentially in a war zone (which is all of them).

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Contact information for the author of this newsletter:

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company