Note: If you wish to make a public comment on Holtec's ridiculous request for an unwarranted waiver, the deadline is just a few hours from now: 4:15 pm EST on Thursday, October 8, 2026.
To Marlayna Doell, Project Manager, Operating Radiation Licensing Branch 3
Marlayna.Doell@nrc.gov
Re: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2627/ML26275A214.pdf and https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2627/ML26273A469.pdf
October 7, 2026
Dear Ms Doell,
Holtec is attempting to use the existence of a RFOL (Renewed Facility Operating License) for the as-yet-still-retired Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in Michigan as an excuse to seek and obtain a waiver for the normal procedures following an accident with significant (or potentially significant) consequences. Instead, they want to have an "emergency" bypass of environmental reviews, safety reviews, cost analysis, and every normal post-accident procedure (including a complete and public analysis of why the accident happened in the first place).
The excuse for invoking an "emergency" waiver thanks to the RFOL is that they had planned to restart by early 2027, and there's no way they can make that deadline if they follow proper procedures. Their investors can see that. The NRC can see that. Even the public can see that, even though we haven't been allowed to see the pictures of the accident where a fuel assembly tilted 30 degrees and is damaged and leaning against the inside of the reactor pressure vessel, under at least 10 feet of water.
The accident (or incident, if you prefer to minimize it) occurred about three weeks ago, but the public only learned about it from a series of Reddit posts someone forwarded to nuclear expert Ed Lyman a few days ago. And suddenly Holtec wants a emergency waiver to repair an accident they wouldn't even admit happened? Something's fishy right there!
Holtec was putting the hottest, most radioactive fuel assemblies back in the reactor -- the ones that were in the reactor when it shut down for "good" (and I do mean good).
If the damaged fuel assembly is stable (as Holtec claims), there is no cause for alarm, and this is NOT an "emergency."
This misuse of "emergency" is made clear in section 2.4 of Holtec's application, which quotes 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), in which the NRC refers to “emergency situations” as those in which failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant’s licensed power level.
This situation is NONE OF THOSE. There is many a slip twixt an August 2026 mistake and a planned and replanned restart now slated for "early 2027" at the earliest. There is NO sure restart date, and Holtec is misusing this option in order to move the damaged fuel assembly to the spent fuel pool "... utilizing different plant equipment and following a different travel path ...". In other words, untested equipment and an untested procedure. They need to be careful, not quick.
Palisades was supposed to close permanently in 2031 but it was old, relatively low-power, unreliable, expensive to operate, and not very profitable. Solar, wind, battery backup, and other renewable energy options were blowing it out of the water price-wise, and that problem continued to get worse when they decided to close early, after failing to get what would have been enormously wasteful public financing.
Holtec bought Palisades from Entergy, supposedly to decommission it until there's nothing left but the worst part: The Spent Fuel. They would profit from this operation by draining the decommissioning fund. But at the end, millions of pounds of spent fuel would still be left, sitting on-site in a pile that grew every day the plant was operating (and will only grow larger if Palisades ever operates again, because there is still no solution for the impossible problem of nuclear waste). All the waste will always be there, at least for the lifespan of most or even everyone alive today.
Holtec transferred all the old fuel out of the reactor, and they began demolishing the reactor — starting with reducing staff, and ending all maintenance procedures.
And they destroyed all the records of production: So now it's unknown what parts tended to fail early, what had been replaced recently... who would need any of that after the plant was permanently closed, right?
Well, wrong on two counts, the first one being obvious in this case: They now plan to reopen the plant but don't have any idea of what's likely to happen, and what was done about it previously, what wiring is the oldest, what was replaced a decade ago, two decades ago, etc..
It's all guesswork now.
The second problem with not having proper records has to do with other, similar reactors (but see note, below). While no two reactors are identical, problems do tend to follow patterns that are easily detectable if enough data is available. As nuclear reactor operators attempt to move to AI-operated reactor systems, prior histories of accidents, incidents, preventive measures and so on become the "training data" for the AI program. But Holtec destroyed all that already. There are numerous parts in any nuclear reactor that should have had special cleaning if the plan was to restart after a long shut-down. This is actually standard-procedure in the industry during long outages — but if the plan is to never re-open the reactor, it's a waste of time and money. Holtec NEVER wants to waste time OR money!
This emergency waiver should be denied. Holtec is NOT in any sort of "emergency" to get Palisades operating. Rather, restarting a reactor that was never supposed to be restarted is invariably a delicate and risky process that must be done carefully, and not rushed. In fact, it's NEVER been done before! Furthermore, Holtec has never operated a reactor, never started one, and had already encountered numerous problems in this risky, foolishly-attempted restart. It's also had a lot of employee turnover.
Neither Holtec nor the NRC has determined, as far as the public can tell, how the accident came about. Is the reactor base faulty or damaged? Was a bolt or a wrench left and NOT NOTICED before trying to place the fuel assembly on top of it, causing the leaning? How did it happen?
What procedural, staff, training, and recording procedures failed — including failing to inform the pubic (and Holtec's investors) about the event in any kind of timely manner (and pictures have still not been released)?
Furthermore, and most importantly, the chance that a "significant" incident occurs during the proposed action is dismissed by Holtec through a series of convenient assumptions. First, the worst-case scenario at the most risky step was defined as a dropped fuel assembly causing significant damage to all [fuel rods in that assembly (DD41)]*, releasing all the toxic (radioactive) isotopes currently held between the fuel pellets and the fuel rods. Therefore, according to Holtec's reasoning -- the current scenario is accepted as being no worse than the worst-case fuel assembly drop accident normally considered.
Given that that MIGHT be true, it IGNORES the fact that such as accident would be extremely expensive, time-consuming, business-crushing, and would hardly be HEALTHY for the public, even if the actual harm was minimal because the radiation dose to the public was reduced by HEPA filters and physical barriers, or sent up the stack to be dispersed by the winds.
The effect of the pressure to rush because HOLTEC considers this repair to be an "emergency" can only increase the risk of a "worst-case scenario" which is precisely why the request should be denied. The only emergency is that in the time it will take to properly correct this problem and restart the reactor, its entire output could have been replaced with solar/wind/battery systems at ZERO risk of "worst-case" accidents needing Price-Anderson, or HEPA filters to protect the public and the workers. There are far more and better jobs in the clean-energy industry, where accidents risking spent nuclear fuel are impossible.
Notably, Holtec's request for an "emergency" waiver and lack of openness smacks of wanting to cover up the true extent of the problem. Holtec is NOT qualified to make the request, NOT qualified to restart Palisades, not qualified to operate Palisades if they ever do get it restarted, and definitely not qualified to supply reliable reports to the public or to the NRC.
The only reason Holtec has stated for requesting an emergency change is that " ... a delay in approval of the proposed changes would result in a delay in the resumption of activities necessary to reach the plant conditions required to restore the plant to power operation." Holtec is claiming that the tilted spent fuel assembly poses no safety hazard so the delay would only cause a financial loss. Again, not a cause for alarm and certainly NOT an "emergency."
Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA
The author has studied nuclear reactor operations for more than 50 years as an independent researcher.
* corrected Thursday and resubmitted from: all "assemblies" to: all "fuel rods in that assembly (DD41)"
Note: Even two reactor units built at the same time right next to each other are invariably significantly different: For example, in one case the Reactor Pressure Vessel of one of a pair of reactors was installed backwards (turned 180 degrees) because the crane operators apparently thought it was going to be just like the other one, but it was a mirror image. This is the same industry that is now promoting "modular" reactors as being basically off an assembly line — and Holtec is concurrently planning to install "small modular reactors" at the Palisades site.
###
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
Ace Hoffman's Nuclear Failures Reports
Ace has studied nuclear issues since the 1960s. This site was NOT written with AI! (A January 2025 conversation with a chatbot is the ONLY exception.)
Wednesday, October 7, 2026
Wednesday, September 30, 2026
Is a guaranteed accident-waiting-to-happen really an accident? Or is it poor planning?
Here is an AP News Alert today (September 30, 2026):
Netanyahu says a pilot on a FlyDubai flight stabbed another and apparently tried to crash the plane September 30, 2026 A pilot stabbed another pilot and then apparently tried to crash [the] aircraft carrying dozens of Israelis, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said. Passengers and crew subdued the attacker, and the plane eventually made an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.
This is hardly the first, second, third, fourth... time something like this has been attempted. Suicidal hijackings of airplanes are often successful: The plane crashes and all aboard die. On 9-11 the planes were used as missiles against specific targets. Nearly thirty years before that, hijackers threatened to target nuclear facilities — but settled for flying to Cuba, where they were promptly arrested (as described in the book Odessey of Terror (1977). This latest event won't be the last. This was one of the few times the suicidal hijacking attempt was successfully defeated. Aircraft flown by airlines from Germany, Malaysia, China and military aircraft in the U.S.A. have all been intentionally crashed into the ground, into mountains, into the ocean... After 9-11, cockpit doors were reinforced (at no small expense in added weight and fuel usage) but obviously that doesn't prevent a crazed pilot from doing something like what reportedly happened today. And one doesn't need a weapon to overpower another person, so checking pilot's carry-on baggage more carefully than apparently happened might help, but is not a complete solution*. Sure, everyone wants AI to be able to solve this problem (no more pilots!) but we're a long way from that as a reality — let alone a safe reality. (AI can do what it wants, that's the problem with AI. And, it has even less morals than your average human... because AI has NONE. And it's already proven that it can be malicious, too.) So is there a solution to this problem? Actually, not entirely. Just plain no. But there are a multitude of things the world can do to reduce the risk. Some might seem unrelated — but are useful anyway. For example, High Speed Rail (HSR). Getting from the center of city A to the center of city B should be as easy as grabbing a downtown bus (and not much more expensive). And come to think of it, AI programming for HSR is undoubtedly far simpler than for an aircraft! This would help by destroying the commercial aircraft industry. Less planes in the fleet means less opportunity for crazy behavior. Also, corporate aircraft need to pay their fair share in landing fees, excess-pollution fees, wasted resources (can't they use Zoom?!?). And with fewer commercial aircraft, those landing fees are going to skyrocket! GOOD! They can take the train like normal people. We'll even let them have a private rail car (for a fee...). But that only reduces the risk of an event by reducing the opportunities. It can be a very significant reduction, though: 95%? 98%? 99.9%? Not bad for making travel cheaper, easier, and safer for everyone! However, there is still the question, or problem, of targets. The twin towers are gone, but what's next on the next terrorist's list? As mentioned above, nuclear sites are expected (by experts, and by historical example) to be targets. And yet America is spending tens of billions of dollars to build "Small Modular" nuclear reactors (called "SMRs" by the media). But let's call them what they are: Targets. Each SMR, no matter that they are called "small", can devastate a city if the SMR is destroyed while operating, or after having operated for even a few moments, once. Once long ago, for that matter. Long-lived radioactive isotopes, short-lived radioactive isotopes, and everything in-between are created in massive quantities in order to produce the tremendous heat needed to turn turbines to produce electricity (or even just to direct-connect heat transducers to plutonium-238 for space missions. It takes an awful amount of Pu-238 just to light a lightbulb!) Right now there are 93 operating targets — pardon me, commercial nuclear reactors — in America, plus spent fuel sites, university reactors, military reactors in port and at sea, etc.. If we add the 1000 SMRs that are planned, and if we keep flying huge aircraft above them, there's going to be a match (or rather, a horrible mismatch) at some point. It might be intentional, but it might not. Planes fall out of the sky due to accidental mid-air collisions, loss of control due to hot-dogging maneuvers, mechanical failure, weather (cross-winds during landing, icing, lightening strikes, etc.), fuel loss, loss of orientation, pilot medical emergencies, etc. etc. etc.. Less targets equates to less chance of both accidental and intentional catastrophic events. Taking precautions that save money, lives, and the environment while making the planet more livable for everybody makes sense. Distributed renewable energy, high speed rail... these are just a few things that are safe, doable, and beneficial for society as a whole and for every individual on earth. by Ace Hoffman * It was later determined that the co-pilot used the cockpit's crash ax, according to a UAE statement published in AP News Alerts, Oct. 3, 2026. ###
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
Netanyahu says a pilot on a FlyDubai flight stabbed another and apparently tried to crash the plane September 30, 2026 A pilot stabbed another pilot and then apparently tried to crash [the] aircraft carrying dozens of Israelis, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said. Passengers and crew subdued the attacker, and the plane eventually made an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.
This is hardly the first, second, third, fourth... time something like this has been attempted. Suicidal hijackings of airplanes are often successful: The plane crashes and all aboard die. On 9-11 the planes were used as missiles against specific targets. Nearly thirty years before that, hijackers threatened to target nuclear facilities — but settled for flying to Cuba, where they were promptly arrested (as described in the book Odessey of Terror (1977). This latest event won't be the last. This was one of the few times the suicidal hijacking attempt was successfully defeated. Aircraft flown by airlines from Germany, Malaysia, China and military aircraft in the U.S.A. have all been intentionally crashed into the ground, into mountains, into the ocean... After 9-11, cockpit doors were reinforced (at no small expense in added weight and fuel usage) but obviously that doesn't prevent a crazed pilot from doing something like what reportedly happened today. And one doesn't need a weapon to overpower another person, so checking pilot's carry-on baggage more carefully than apparently happened might help, but is not a complete solution*. Sure, everyone wants AI to be able to solve this problem (no more pilots!) but we're a long way from that as a reality — let alone a safe reality. (AI can do what it wants, that's the problem with AI. And, it has even less morals than your average human... because AI has NONE. And it's already proven that it can be malicious, too.) So is there a solution to this problem? Actually, not entirely. Just plain no. But there are a multitude of things the world can do to reduce the risk. Some might seem unrelated — but are useful anyway. For example, High Speed Rail (HSR). Getting from the center of city A to the center of city B should be as easy as grabbing a downtown bus (and not much more expensive). And come to think of it, AI programming for HSR is undoubtedly far simpler than for an aircraft! This would help by destroying the commercial aircraft industry. Less planes in the fleet means less opportunity for crazy behavior. Also, corporate aircraft need to pay their fair share in landing fees, excess-pollution fees, wasted resources (can't they use Zoom?!?). And with fewer commercial aircraft, those landing fees are going to skyrocket! GOOD! They can take the train like normal people. We'll even let them have a private rail car (for a fee...). But that only reduces the risk of an event by reducing the opportunities. It can be a very significant reduction, though: 95%? 98%? 99.9%? Not bad for making travel cheaper, easier, and safer for everyone! However, there is still the question, or problem, of targets. The twin towers are gone, but what's next on the next terrorist's list? As mentioned above, nuclear sites are expected (by experts, and by historical example) to be targets. And yet America is spending tens of billions of dollars to build "Small Modular" nuclear reactors (called "SMRs" by the media). But let's call them what they are: Targets. Each SMR, no matter that they are called "small", can devastate a city if the SMR is destroyed while operating, or after having operated for even a few moments, once. Once long ago, for that matter. Long-lived radioactive isotopes, short-lived radioactive isotopes, and everything in-between are created in massive quantities in order to produce the tremendous heat needed to turn turbines to produce electricity (or even just to direct-connect heat transducers to plutonium-238 for space missions. It takes an awful amount of Pu-238 just to light a lightbulb!) Right now there are 93 operating targets — pardon me, commercial nuclear reactors — in America, plus spent fuel sites, university reactors, military reactors in port and at sea, etc.. If we add the 1000 SMRs that are planned, and if we keep flying huge aircraft above them, there's going to be a match (or rather, a horrible mismatch) at some point. It might be intentional, but it might not. Planes fall out of the sky due to accidental mid-air collisions, loss of control due to hot-dogging maneuvers, mechanical failure, weather (cross-winds during landing, icing, lightening strikes, etc.), fuel loss, loss of orientation, pilot medical emergencies, etc. etc. etc.. Less targets equates to less chance of both accidental and intentional catastrophic events. Taking precautions that save money, lives, and the environment while making the planet more livable for everybody makes sense. Distributed renewable energy, high speed rail... these are just a few things that are safe, doable, and beneficial for society as a whole and for every individual on earth. by Ace Hoffman * It was later determined that the co-pilot used the cockpit's crash ax, according to a UAE statement published in AP News Alerts, Oct. 3, 2026. ###
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
Thursday, September 24, 2026
Comments on a revised cask design are due tomorrow (Friday 9-25-26)) for NRC-2026-2806-0001
Post comments here: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2026-2806-0001
Identify comments with: Docket ID NRC-2026-2806
Our comment (posted Sept. 24, 2026) has NRC Comment Tracking Number: mug-cuvr-z1vx (yes, they call that a "number")
The final version of the rule, which contains far more detail than the proposed rule, and will automatically be finalized on November 9, 2026 unless " ... the NRC receives any significant adverse comment ..." is available here: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2026-2806-0002
We oppose implementing the proposed rule covered by docket id: NRC-2026-2806. In particular we object to moving this proposed rule to a final rule without a full explanation, disclosure, and understanding of the potential environmental impacts.
According to the Federal Registry publication of this proposed rule, the NRC plans to approve a design change for a particular spent fuel storage cask design: TN Americas, LLC StandardizedNUHOMS® Horizontal Modular Storage System. More specifically, the rule allows an " ... improved basket design using staggered plates ...". Whether this design offers more protection or less to the public and the environment is not specified and there is no "plain language" (as required by law) that explains exactly what is changing.
The NRC says that the change " ... does not reflect a significant change in design or fabrication of the cask." This statement leads directly to the conclusion that the rule change entails: " ... no significant increase in the individual or cumulative radiation exposures, and no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences from, radiological accidents." Without a definition of "significant" and a clear explanation of the tradeoffs that led to this requested design change, the public cannot evaluate the proposed rule. For example, ML26103A252 (which describes information about the proposed new design) includes the phrase: " ... a unique design and a higher heat load ...". This certainly sounds significant. If a "higher heat load" is NOT significant, why mention it? More to the point, in what way would that be insignificant and yet be the whole point of the "unique design"? (ML26103A252 is available here: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2610/ML26103A252.pdf)
Equally important, the design is a moving target. Less than two years after the original submission (November 5, 2024) the design of the system is being revised. What was wrong with the previous design? Were there engineering flaws, or did the applicant simply find a way to cut costs without (according to the applicant) impacting safety? Similarly, somewhere in the many pages of technical jargon we find that the " ... applicant requested to withdraw Change No. 2 during the process of the review ...". Why? How much of the evaluation was completed before Change No. 2 was withdrawn? How much time did the NRC waste on "Change No. 2"? What was the cost to the public of uselessly evaluating Change No. 2?
This proposed rule should be rejected because neither the applicant nor the NRC has explicitly addressed whether this design change would improve safety which should be the primary criteria for a spent-fuel cask design. Rather, it appears that it will increase RISK by allowing an increased thermal load, which will have a corresponding increased radioactivity load. In fact, why is it referred to as an higher "heat" load when that is a direct result of an increased radioactivity load?
Once we stop producing more nuclear waste (since nobody has a solution for storing it for the millennia it remains dangerous), it might be worthwhile to consider these design changes in light of the need for eternal storage of nuclear waste. However, the argument that it will be more expensive for licensees to prepare exemption requests and for the NRC to review them than to reject the design change is disingenuous.
We incorporate by reference and adopt as our own the entirety of the comments submitted by Steven Singleton (https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NRC-2026-2806-0003 tracking #: mtw-cjsu-atw9)
Ace & Sharon Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
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