Does AI have a brain?
No.
Not "I don't think so." Just "No."
And renaming it Super-Intelligence doesn't help. (I've always preferred calling it "Imitation Intelligence" as long-time readers know).
AI is good at imitating intelligence. So are some people, especially those with good memories.
But remembering a fact — such as that: "correlation does not prove causation" doesn't mean you apply it properly in all circumstances. Memorizing facts isn't intelligence.
AI doesn't even do that, though — it sorts through the quips and blurbs it's found in the past and applies the ones that statistically seems most appropriate, in the word patterns used by the intended recipient. The main goal of most AIs is to keep you engaged, and to do that, they have to please you. They don't have to be honest, or helpful, or moral. If its goal is to get you to come back time and again (so it can gather information about you or information that you have that it wants), you have to like it.
A few days ago Ukraine took out a major portion of Russia's AI Data Centers, and people around the world noticed a sudden drop in all sorts of attacks: Flaming comments from supposed patriots in support of traitorous behavior being the most noticeable for many people.
For the author of this blog, it was a sudden drop, over a matter of hours, to about 1/30th of the recent traffic at this web site (see image of the drop that approximately matches the timing of Ukraine's successful attacks on Russia's data centers).
Beginning about three months ago, traffic here had been growing tremendously: from an average of about 20k visits a month (according to Google's statistics) to a whopping 153,000+ this month -- and it's only the 11th day of the month! But about 30 hours ago, the "deluge" ended over a three-hour period. Visits have dropped back to about a thousand a day, which is exciting and treasured to see — but 52,568 in one day didn't seem real...because it wasn't (but it happened (according to Google's stats) on October 8, 2026).
Why would Russia be interested in this web site?
Perhaps because ROSATOM is just about the most corrupt corporation on the planet (as I wrote in 2018) and is pushing nuclear power all around the world (According the World Nuclear News Daily (WNN): "The first unit at Bangladesh's Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant achieved criticality - a self-sustaining nuclear reaction - at 15:34 on Sunday, 11 October [2026]"). Russia is forcing countries to be tied financially to Russia for decades to come, and in return Russia gets free nuclear weapons source material (mainly the plutonium (Pu-239) every reactor produces, as well as the Uranium (U-235) that's left in the "spent" fuel (only a fraction is actually "burned up" during use in a reactor)).
There may be other reasons: Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of man (or machine)?
It's important to recognize Russia's influence all over the world. For example, besides Bangladesh, Russia is pushing nuclear power in many other countries, which may explain this next chart, showing the total visits from the top 19 countries for October 11, 2026. In the last week of the "deluge" the United States was as low as 8th; well below normal.
There are several "take-aways" from this event. Most importantly, watch out for propaganda!!! A lot of what Russia publishes is completely false. Do they plan to make a copy of my web site but with misleading statements? Others people have reported huge drops in fake-name, fake-photo, fake "patriots" attacking them on Twitter and/or Bluesky and other platforms, claiming to be proud American Trump supporters, which is a conflicting position to be in, to say the least!
There's no knowing why I'd been subject to a deluge of visits. It's interesting that Google seems to distinguish between these visits and other types of visits: One is recorded as shown, the other is indicated by the actual counts for individual essays, a recent example is posted on the left. Those have continued to climb, but nothing like by 52,568 total in one day for the 480 or so essays I've posted here: That would be an average of over 100 new visits to every essay just on October 8, 2026! As shown here are the current top 20 essays and their most recent 24-totals (after the "deluge").
One last thing: For any real Russians visiting (2 in the last 24 hours): Welcome! Let's work together to make the world a safer, fairer, more equal and totally non-nuclear place!
Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA
###
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
Ace Hoffman's Nuclear Failures Reports
Ace has studied nuclear issues since the 1960s. This site was NOT written with AI! (A January 2025 conversation with a chatbot is the ONLY exception.)
Monday, October 12, 2026
Sunday, October 11, 2026
Comments Due 20261013 (THIS TUESDAY!) on NRC-2025-1204-0004: In Situ Recovery Monitoring and Decommissioning Timelines
Post comments here: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2025-1204-0004
Re: Docket ID NRC–2025–1204
Our comment ID for the comment below is: mv4-c8wi-bawt
We strongly oppose the rulemaking proposed in NRC–2025–1204, In Situ Recovery Monitoring and Decommissioning Timeliness. In the context of this proposed rule, In Situ Recovery (ISR) refers to a process for extracting uranium via chemical leaching, which liquefies a portion of the rock, allowing the uranium-bearing liquid to be pumped to the surface for further processing. ISR uranium processing has been used commercially since the late 1970s and has been the primary method of uranium extraction in the U.S. since the 1990s. ISR uranium processing is unnecessary and unsafe. The process inevitably contaminates groundwater, which cannot be returned to its previous state -- whether the contaminate is a leaching agent that was left behind or radioactive isotopes that were released but not extracted during the leaching process. Groundwater travels through pathways that are not accurately mapped which means that contamination from uranium extraction cannot be guaranteed to be restricted to the "production unit" (e.g., the ISR site), which is the only area that requires even theoretical cleanup. The proposed rule also limits the length of groundwater monitoring in the production site to just one year. Groundwater at each ISR location will behave differently due to natural variations water chemistry and geology (e.g., tiny fissures in the surrounding rock). Variations in rainfall or irrigation runoff can also impact both the volume and chemistry of groundwater, so even at a single site, the behavior of the groundwater may be different at different times. Groundwater can remain in an aquifer for tens of thousands of years, and there are places in the United States where some of today's drinking water comes from glaciers that melted at the end of the last ice age. Neither existing NRC regulations nor the proposed new regulations directly address contamination of groundwater beyond the production site. Instead they rely on criteria such as " ... the construction of wells, the design of ISR wellfields, and groundwater monitoring [within the production site] ... " to protect the aquifers. The net result of ISR uranium processing is potential contamination of drinking water for millions of people for millions of years — for something nobody needs. The United States does not need more uranium, because the United States does not need more nuclear weapons or nuclear reactors. No uranium is needed for refueling, because all the existing reactors should be shut down. Nobody knows what to do with the nuclear waste that already exists, which will continue to be hazardous to all living things for hundreds of millennia. Both the operating reactors and the waste are also weapons proliferation risks as well as targets for enemy or terrorist attacks. The proposed rulemaking does not even protect the environment from the immediate results of ISR uranium processing. The rule would allow companies who want to profit from ISR uranium processing to simply request an exemption if cleaning up the production site to the required standard is too difficult (i.e., too expensive). Before any ISR uranium processing project is licensed, the NRC and the EPA should define consequences for failure to clean up the production site , and require the company requesting a license to provide proof that clean-up is possible — and that they can pay for it even if they go bust for any reason. (Such proof is impossible to provide for the reasons explained above, and for that reason alone the NRC should not continue to license ISR uranium processing.) This rulemaking is titled In Situ Recovery Monitoring and Decommissioning Timeliness because in addition to the proposed changes to licensing for ISR uranium processing, the same rule makes substantive changes to an unrelated part of NRC regulations: decommissioning timelines for nuclear reactors. Including these two different topics within the same proposed rulemaking, and allowing only a 30-day public comment period without any scheduled public meetings makes it extremely difficult for citizens, public-interest organizations, government organizations, and tribal stakeholders to evaluate and comment on the proposed rulemaking. Although some of the proposed changes have been discussed for at least five years as shown by the July 2020 EPA-NRC Memorandum of Understanding on ISR Rulemaking cited in this rulemaking, nevertheless the information provided for public comment is far from complete. Before any further consideration of this rule, the NRC should provide the additional information and extend the public comment period as requested by the New Mexico Dept. of Justice. We incorporate by reference and adopt as our own the entirety of the comments submitted by the following parties: Lynda Williams: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NRC-2025-1204-0006 (tracking #: mtx-h1f9-88d4) New Mexico Dept. of Justice: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NRC-2025-1204-0014 (tracking #: mu5-y1qn-da05)
Submitted by Sharon and Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
We strongly oppose the rulemaking proposed in NRC–2025–1204, In Situ Recovery Monitoring and Decommissioning Timeliness. In the context of this proposed rule, In Situ Recovery (ISR) refers to a process for extracting uranium via chemical leaching, which liquefies a portion of the rock, allowing the uranium-bearing liquid to be pumped to the surface for further processing. ISR uranium processing has been used commercially since the late 1970s and has been the primary method of uranium extraction in the U.S. since the 1990s. ISR uranium processing is unnecessary and unsafe. The process inevitably contaminates groundwater, which cannot be returned to its previous state -- whether the contaminate is a leaching agent that was left behind or radioactive isotopes that were released but not extracted during the leaching process. Groundwater travels through pathways that are not accurately mapped which means that contamination from uranium extraction cannot be guaranteed to be restricted to the "production unit" (e.g., the ISR site), which is the only area that requires even theoretical cleanup. The proposed rule also limits the length of groundwater monitoring in the production site to just one year. Groundwater at each ISR location will behave differently due to natural variations water chemistry and geology (e.g., tiny fissures in the surrounding rock). Variations in rainfall or irrigation runoff can also impact both the volume and chemistry of groundwater, so even at a single site, the behavior of the groundwater may be different at different times. Groundwater can remain in an aquifer for tens of thousands of years, and there are places in the United States where some of today's drinking water comes from glaciers that melted at the end of the last ice age. Neither existing NRC regulations nor the proposed new regulations directly address contamination of groundwater beyond the production site. Instead they rely on criteria such as " ... the construction of wells, the design of ISR wellfields, and groundwater monitoring [within the production site] ... " to protect the aquifers. The net result of ISR uranium processing is potential contamination of drinking water for millions of people for millions of years — for something nobody needs. The United States does not need more uranium, because the United States does not need more nuclear weapons or nuclear reactors. No uranium is needed for refueling, because all the existing reactors should be shut down. Nobody knows what to do with the nuclear waste that already exists, which will continue to be hazardous to all living things for hundreds of millennia. Both the operating reactors and the waste are also weapons proliferation risks as well as targets for enemy or terrorist attacks. The proposed rulemaking does not even protect the environment from the immediate results of ISR uranium processing. The rule would allow companies who want to profit from ISR uranium processing to simply request an exemption if cleaning up the production site to the required standard is too difficult (i.e., too expensive). Before any ISR uranium processing project is licensed, the NRC and the EPA should define consequences for failure to clean up the production site , and require the company requesting a license to provide proof that clean-up is possible — and that they can pay for it even if they go bust for any reason. (Such proof is impossible to provide for the reasons explained above, and for that reason alone the NRC should not continue to license ISR uranium processing.) This rulemaking is titled In Situ Recovery Monitoring and Decommissioning Timeliness because in addition to the proposed changes to licensing for ISR uranium processing, the same rule makes substantive changes to an unrelated part of NRC regulations: decommissioning timelines for nuclear reactors. Including these two different topics within the same proposed rulemaking, and allowing only a 30-day public comment period without any scheduled public meetings makes it extremely difficult for citizens, public-interest organizations, government organizations, and tribal stakeholders to evaluate and comment on the proposed rulemaking. Although some of the proposed changes have been discussed for at least five years as shown by the July 2020 EPA-NRC Memorandum of Understanding on ISR Rulemaking cited in this rulemaking, nevertheless the information provided for public comment is far from complete. Before any further consideration of this rule, the NRC should provide the additional information and extend the public comment period as requested by the New Mexico Dept. of Justice. We incorporate by reference and adopt as our own the entirety of the comments submitted by the following parties: Lynda Williams: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NRC-2025-1204-0006 (tracking #: mtx-h1f9-88d4) New Mexico Dept. of Justice: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NRC-2025-1204-0014 (tracking #: mu5-y1qn-da05)
Submitted by Sharon and Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
Wednesday, October 7, 2026
Holtec misuses its RFOL as an excuse to rush Palisades restart (after hiding problems as long as possible)
Note: If you wish to make a public comment on Holtec's ridiculous request for an unwarranted waiver, the deadline is just a few hours from now: 4:15 pm EST on Thursday, October 8, 2026.
To Marlayna Doell, Project Manager, Operating Radiation Licensing Branch 3 Marlayna.Doell@nrc.gov Re: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2627/ML26275A214.pdf and https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2627/ML26273A469.pdf October 7, 2026 Dear Ms Doell, Holtec is attempting to use the existence of a RFOL (Renewed Facility Operating License) for the as-yet-still-retired Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in Michigan as an excuse to seek and obtain a waiver for the normal procedures following an accident with significant (or potentially significant) consequences. Instead, they want to have an "emergency" bypass of environmental reviews, safety reviews, cost analysis, and every normal post-accident procedure (including a complete and public analysis of why the accident happened in the first place). The excuse for invoking an "emergency" waiver thanks to the RFOL is that they had planned to restart by early 2027, and there's no way they can make that deadline if they follow proper procedures. Their investors can see that. The NRC can see that. Even the public can see that, even though we haven't been allowed to see the pictures of the accident where a fuel assembly tilted 30 degrees and is damaged and leaning against the inside of the reactor pressure vessel, under at least 10 feet of water. The accident (or incident, if you prefer to minimize it) occurred about three weeks ago, but the public only learned about it from a series of Reddit posts someone forwarded to nuclear expert Ed Lyman a few days ago. And suddenly Holtec wants a emergency waiver to repair an accident they wouldn't even admit happened? Something's fishy right there! Holtec was putting the hottest, most radioactive fuel assemblies back in the reactor -- the ones that were in the reactor when it shut down for "good" (and I do mean good). If the damaged fuel assembly is stable (as Holtec claims), there is no cause for alarm, and this is NOT an "emergency." This misuse of "emergency" is made clear in section 2.4 of Holtec's application, which quotes 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), in which the NRC refers to “emergency situations” as those in which failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant’s licensed power level. This situation is NONE OF THOSE. There is many a slip twixt an August 2026 mistake and a planned and replanned restart now slated for "early 2027" at the earliest. There is NO sure restart date, and Holtec is misusing this option in order to move the damaged fuel assembly to the spent fuel pool "... utilizing different plant equipment and following a different travel path ...". In other words, untested equipment and an untested procedure. They need to be careful, not quick. Palisades was supposed to close permanently in 2031 but it was old, relatively low-power, unreliable, expensive to operate, and not very profitable. Solar, wind, battery backup, and other renewable energy options were blowing it out of the water price-wise, and that problem continued to get worse when they decided to close early, after failing to get what would have been enormously wasteful public financing. Holtec bought Palisades from Entergy, supposedly to decommission it until there's nothing left but the worst part: The Spent Fuel. They would profit from this operation by draining the decommissioning fund. But at the end, millions of pounds of spent fuel would still be left, sitting on-site in a pile that grew every day the plant was operating (and will only grow larger if Palisades ever operates again, because there is still no solution for the impossible problem of nuclear waste). All the waste will always be there, at least for the lifespan of most or even everyone alive today. Holtec transferred all the old fuel out of the reactor, and they began demolishing the reactor — starting with reducing staff, and ending all maintenance procedures. And they destroyed all the records of production: So now it's unknown what parts tended to fail early, what had been replaced recently... who would need any of that after the plant was permanently closed, right? Well, wrong on two counts, the first one being obvious in this case: They now plan to reopen the plant but don't have any idea of what's likely to happen, and what was done about it previously, what wiring is the oldest, what was replaced a decade ago, two decades ago, etc.. It's all guesswork now. The second problem with not having proper records has to do with other, similar reactors (but see note, below). While no two reactors are identical, problems do tend to follow patterns that are easily detectable if enough data is available. As nuclear reactor operators attempt to move to AI-operated reactor systems, prior histories of accidents, incidents, preventive measures and so on become the "training data" for the AI program. But Holtec destroyed all that already. There are numerous parts in any nuclear reactor that should have had special cleaning if the plan was to restart after a long shut-down. This is actually standard-procedure in the industry during long outages — but if the plan is to never re-open the reactor, it's a waste of time and money. Holtec NEVER wants to waste time OR money! This emergency waiver should be denied. Holtec is NOT in any sort of "emergency" to get Palisades operating. Rather, restarting a reactor that was never supposed to be restarted is invariably a delicate and risky process that must be done carefully, and not rushed. In fact, it's NEVER been done before! Furthermore, Holtec has never operated a reactor, never started one, and had already encountered numerous problems in this risky, foolishly-attempted restart. It's also had a lot of employee turnover. Neither Holtec nor the NRC has determined, as far as the public can tell, how the accident came about. Is the reactor base faulty or damaged? Was a bolt or a wrench left and NOT NOTICED before trying to place the fuel assembly on top of it, causing the leaning? How did it happen? What procedural, staff, training, and recording procedures failed — including failing to inform the pubic (and Holtec's investors) about the event in any kind of timely manner (and pictures have still not been released)? Furthermore, and most importantly, the chance that a "significant" incident occurs during the proposed action is dismissed by Holtec through a series of convenient assumptions. First, the worst-case scenario at the most risky step was defined as a dropped fuel assembly causing significant damage to all [fuel rods in that assembly (DD41)]*, releasing all the toxic (radioactive) isotopes currently held between the fuel pellets and the fuel rods. Therefore, according to Holtec's reasoning -- the current scenario is accepted as being no worse than the worst-case fuel assembly drop accident normally considered. Given that that MIGHT be true, it IGNORES the fact that such as accident would be extremely expensive, time-consuming, business-crushing, and would hardly be HEALTHY for the public, even if the actual harm was minimal because the radiation dose to the public was reduced by HEPA filters and physical barriers, or sent up the stack to be dispersed by the winds. The effect of the pressure to rush because HOLTEC considers this repair to be an "emergency" can only increase the risk of a "worst-case scenario" which is precisely why the request should be denied. The only emergency is that in the time it will take to properly correct this problem and restart the reactor, its entire output could have been replaced with solar/wind/battery systems at ZERO risk of "worst-case" accidents needing Price-Anderson, or HEPA filters to protect the public and the workers. There are far more and better jobs in the clean-energy industry, where accidents risking spent nuclear fuel are impossible. Notably, Holtec's request for an "emergency" waiver and lack of openness smacks of wanting to cover up the true extent of the problem. Holtec is NOT qualified to make the request, NOT qualified to restart Palisades, not qualified to operate Palisades if they ever do get it restarted, and definitely not qualified to supply reliable reports to the public or to the NRC. The only reason Holtec has stated for requesting an emergency change is that " ... a delay in approval of the proposed changes would result in a delay in the resumption of activities necessary to reach the plant conditions required to restore the plant to power operation." Holtec is claiming that the tilted spent fuel assembly poses no safety hazard so the delay would only cause a financial loss. Again, not a cause for alarm and certainly NOT an "emergency." Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA The author has studied nuclear reactor operations for more than 50 years as an independent researcher. * corrected Thursday and resubmitted from: all "assemblies" to: all "fuel rods in that assembly (DD41)" Note: Even two reactor units built at the same time right next to each other are invariably significantly different: For example, in one case the Reactor Pressure Vessel of one of a pair of reactors was installed backwards (turned 180 degrees) because the crane operators apparently thought it was going to be just like the other one, but it was a mirror image. This is the same industry that is now promoting "modular" reactors as being basically off an assembly line — and Holtec is concurrently planning to install "small modular reactors" at the Palisades site. ###
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
To Marlayna Doell, Project Manager, Operating Radiation Licensing Branch 3 Marlayna.Doell@nrc.gov Re: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2627/ML26275A214.pdf and https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2627/ML26273A469.pdf October 7, 2026 Dear Ms Doell, Holtec is attempting to use the existence of a RFOL (Renewed Facility Operating License) for the as-yet-still-retired Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in Michigan as an excuse to seek and obtain a waiver for the normal procedures following an accident with significant (or potentially significant) consequences. Instead, they want to have an "emergency" bypass of environmental reviews, safety reviews, cost analysis, and every normal post-accident procedure (including a complete and public analysis of why the accident happened in the first place). The excuse for invoking an "emergency" waiver thanks to the RFOL is that they had planned to restart by early 2027, and there's no way they can make that deadline if they follow proper procedures. Their investors can see that. The NRC can see that. Even the public can see that, even though we haven't been allowed to see the pictures of the accident where a fuel assembly tilted 30 degrees and is damaged and leaning against the inside of the reactor pressure vessel, under at least 10 feet of water. The accident (or incident, if you prefer to minimize it) occurred about three weeks ago, but the public only learned about it from a series of Reddit posts someone forwarded to nuclear expert Ed Lyman a few days ago. And suddenly Holtec wants a emergency waiver to repair an accident they wouldn't even admit happened? Something's fishy right there! Holtec was putting the hottest, most radioactive fuel assemblies back in the reactor -- the ones that were in the reactor when it shut down for "good" (and I do mean good). If the damaged fuel assembly is stable (as Holtec claims), there is no cause for alarm, and this is NOT an "emergency." This misuse of "emergency" is made clear in section 2.4 of Holtec's application, which quotes 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), in which the NRC refers to “emergency situations” as those in which failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant’s licensed power level. This situation is NONE OF THOSE. There is many a slip twixt an August 2026 mistake and a planned and replanned restart now slated for "early 2027" at the earliest. There is NO sure restart date, and Holtec is misusing this option in order to move the damaged fuel assembly to the spent fuel pool "... utilizing different plant equipment and following a different travel path ...". In other words, untested equipment and an untested procedure. They need to be careful, not quick. Palisades was supposed to close permanently in 2031 but it was old, relatively low-power, unreliable, expensive to operate, and not very profitable. Solar, wind, battery backup, and other renewable energy options were blowing it out of the water price-wise, and that problem continued to get worse when they decided to close early, after failing to get what would have been enormously wasteful public financing. Holtec bought Palisades from Entergy, supposedly to decommission it until there's nothing left but the worst part: The Spent Fuel. They would profit from this operation by draining the decommissioning fund. But at the end, millions of pounds of spent fuel would still be left, sitting on-site in a pile that grew every day the plant was operating (and will only grow larger if Palisades ever operates again, because there is still no solution for the impossible problem of nuclear waste). All the waste will always be there, at least for the lifespan of most or even everyone alive today. Holtec transferred all the old fuel out of the reactor, and they began demolishing the reactor — starting with reducing staff, and ending all maintenance procedures. And they destroyed all the records of production: So now it's unknown what parts tended to fail early, what had been replaced recently... who would need any of that after the plant was permanently closed, right? Well, wrong on two counts, the first one being obvious in this case: They now plan to reopen the plant but don't have any idea of what's likely to happen, and what was done about it previously, what wiring is the oldest, what was replaced a decade ago, two decades ago, etc.. It's all guesswork now. The second problem with not having proper records has to do with other, similar reactors (but see note, below). While no two reactors are identical, problems do tend to follow patterns that are easily detectable if enough data is available. As nuclear reactor operators attempt to move to AI-operated reactor systems, prior histories of accidents, incidents, preventive measures and so on become the "training data" for the AI program. But Holtec destroyed all that already. There are numerous parts in any nuclear reactor that should have had special cleaning if the plan was to restart after a long shut-down. This is actually standard-procedure in the industry during long outages — but if the plan is to never re-open the reactor, it's a waste of time and money. Holtec NEVER wants to waste time OR money! This emergency waiver should be denied. Holtec is NOT in any sort of "emergency" to get Palisades operating. Rather, restarting a reactor that was never supposed to be restarted is invariably a delicate and risky process that must be done carefully, and not rushed. In fact, it's NEVER been done before! Furthermore, Holtec has never operated a reactor, never started one, and had already encountered numerous problems in this risky, foolishly-attempted restart. It's also had a lot of employee turnover. Neither Holtec nor the NRC has determined, as far as the public can tell, how the accident came about. Is the reactor base faulty or damaged? Was a bolt or a wrench left and NOT NOTICED before trying to place the fuel assembly on top of it, causing the leaning? How did it happen? What procedural, staff, training, and recording procedures failed — including failing to inform the pubic (and Holtec's investors) about the event in any kind of timely manner (and pictures have still not been released)? Furthermore, and most importantly, the chance that a "significant" incident occurs during the proposed action is dismissed by Holtec through a series of convenient assumptions. First, the worst-case scenario at the most risky step was defined as a dropped fuel assembly causing significant damage to all [fuel rods in that assembly (DD41)]*, releasing all the toxic (radioactive) isotopes currently held between the fuel pellets and the fuel rods. Therefore, according to Holtec's reasoning -- the current scenario is accepted as being no worse than the worst-case fuel assembly drop accident normally considered. Given that that MIGHT be true, it IGNORES the fact that such as accident would be extremely expensive, time-consuming, business-crushing, and would hardly be HEALTHY for the public, even if the actual harm was minimal because the radiation dose to the public was reduced by HEPA filters and physical barriers, or sent up the stack to be dispersed by the winds. The effect of the pressure to rush because HOLTEC considers this repair to be an "emergency" can only increase the risk of a "worst-case scenario" which is precisely why the request should be denied. The only emergency is that in the time it will take to properly correct this problem and restart the reactor, its entire output could have been replaced with solar/wind/battery systems at ZERO risk of "worst-case" accidents needing Price-Anderson, or HEPA filters to protect the public and the workers. There are far more and better jobs in the clean-energy industry, where accidents risking spent nuclear fuel are impossible. Notably, Holtec's request for an "emergency" waiver and lack of openness smacks of wanting to cover up the true extent of the problem. Holtec is NOT qualified to make the request, NOT qualified to restart Palisades, not qualified to operate Palisades if they ever do get it restarted, and definitely not qualified to supply reliable reports to the public or to the NRC. The only reason Holtec has stated for requesting an emergency change is that " ... a delay in approval of the proposed changes would result in a delay in the resumption of activities necessary to reach the plant conditions required to restore the plant to power operation." Holtec is claiming that the tilted spent fuel assembly poses no safety hazard so the delay would only cause a financial loss. Again, not a cause for alarm and certainly NOT an "emergency." Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA The author has studied nuclear reactor operations for more than 50 years as an independent researcher. * corrected Thursday and resubmitted from: all "assemblies" to: all "fuel rods in that assembly (DD41)" Note: Even two reactor units built at the same time right next to each other are invariably significantly different: For example, in one case the Reactor Pressure Vessel of one of a pair of reactors was installed backwards (turned 180 degrees) because the crane operators apparently thought it was going to be just like the other one, but it was a mirror image. This is the same industry that is now promoting "modular" reactors as being basically off an assembly line — and Holtec is concurrently planning to install "small modular reactors" at the Palisades site. ###
Contact information for the author of this newsletter:
Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company
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