Thursday, September 24, 2026

Comments on a revised cask design are due tomorrow (Friday 9-25-26)) for NRC-2026-2806-0001

Post comments here: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2026-2806-0001

Identify comments with: Docket ID NRC-2026-2806

Our comment (posted Sept. 24, 2026) has NRC Comment Tracking Number: mug-cuvr-z1vx (yes, they call that a "number")

The final version of the rule, which contains far more detail than the proposed rule, and will automatically be finalized on November 9, 2026 unless " ... the NRC receives any significant adverse comment ..." is available here: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2026-2806-0002

We oppose implementing the proposed rule covered by docket id: NRC-2026-2806. In particular we object to moving this proposed rule to a final rule without a full explanation, disclosure, and understanding of the potential environmental impacts.

According to the Federal Registry publication of this proposed rule, the NRC plans to approve a design change for a particular spent fuel storage cask design: TN Americas, LLC StandardizedNUHOMS® Horizontal Modular Storage System. More specifically, the rule allows an " ... improved basket design using staggered plates ...". Whether this design offers more protection or less to the public and the environment is not specified and there is no "plain language" (as required by law) that explains exactly what is changing.

The NRC says that the change " ... does not reflect a significant change in design or fabrication of the cask." This statement leads directly to the conclusion that the rule change entails: " ... no significant increase in the individual or cumulative radiation exposures, and no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences from, radiological accidents." Without a definition of "significant" and a clear explanation of the tradeoffs that led to this requested design change, the public cannot evaluate the proposed rule. For example, ML26103A252 (which describes information about the proposed new design) includes the phrase: " ... a unique design and a higher heat load ...". This certainly sounds significant. If a "higher heat load" is NOT significant, why mention it? More to the point, in what way would that be insignificant and yet be the whole point of the "unique design"? (ML26103A252 is available here: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2610/ML26103A252.pdf)

Equally important, the design is a moving target. Less than two years after the original submission (November 5, 2024) the design of the system is being revised. What was wrong with the previous design? Were there engineering flaws, or did the applicant simply find a way to cut costs without (according to the applicant) impacting safety? Similarly, somewhere in the many pages of technical jargon we find that the " ... applicant requested to withdraw Change No. 2 during the process of the review ...". Why? How much of the evaluation was completed before Change No. 2 was withdrawn? How much time did the NRC waste on "Change No. 2"? What was the cost to the public of uselessly evaluating Change No. 2?

This proposed rule should be rejected because neither the applicant nor the NRC has explicitly addressed whether this design change would improve safety which should be the primary criteria for a spent-fuel cask design. Rather, it appears that it will increase RISK by allowing an increased thermal load, which will have a corresponding increased radioactivity load. In fact, why is it referred to as an higher "heat" load when that is a direct result of an increased radioactivity load?

Once we stop producing more nuclear waste (since nobody has a solution for storing it for the millennia it remains dangerous), it might be worthwhile to consider these design changes in light of the need for eternal storage of nuclear waste. However, the argument that it will be more expensive for licensees to prepare exemption requests and for the NRC to review them than to reject the design change is disingenuous.

We incorporate by reference and adopt as our own the entirety of the comments submitted by Steven Singleton (https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NRC-2026-2806-0003 tracking #: mtw-cjsu-atw9)

Ace & Sharon Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA



Contact information for the author of this newsletter:

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company



Friday, September 11, 2026

25 years ago today, the world changed forever...

September 11, 2026

25 years ago today, the world changed forever...

Morning news shows were all live. The timing couldn't have been better. That was, of course, part of the plan.

On the West Coast, where I've lived since the early 1990s, the phone rang. It was my mother.

I recall her first words were: "Turn on your T.V." followed by: "TWO planes hit BOTH Twin Towers..."

I turned on my television and saw the smoke wafting from both towers. I went into the other room and called my mom back (most phones were still "land lines" back then) and said "this is going to change everything."

I knew that hundreds must be dead already. This was terrorism at a virtually unprecedented scale, by a virtually unstoppable method of attack. Everything, everyone, was suddenly vulnerable.

Not that we weren't vulnerable all along, but no one had taken advantage of a free society's innate vulnerabilities so thoroughly and successfully before. And it did, indeed, change everything, starting with giving U.S. Presidents an excuse to do just about anything in the name of the "War on Terror" which would begin soon after the attacks.

But that morning, that bleak day — was just beginning.

I went back into the living room, looked at the tv, and asked my wife, who was staring at the T.V.: "What happened to the second tower?!?"

It was gone.

It had fallen, and now thousands more were dead. Of course I could guess what had most likely happened, only to have it pretty thoroughly confirmed as the second tower also fell without further attacks or secondary explosions: Structural failure due to initial impacts of the strong parts of the airplane (engine turbines, wing spars, landing gear, etc.) along with fire from the airplane fuel and building contents, that burns hot enough and long enough to weaken the steel beams just enough...

And all this low enough on the tower to bring down a large enough portion of the building to collapse the rest...

...while high enough up to make bringing fire-fighting equipment up to that level take a long time — especially as they had to go up the same stairs everyone else was using to evacuate.

It was a carefully planned attack, and New York City paid dearly that day, losing hundreds of its most heroic first responders.

Nearly every American lost someone close that day: A friend or old school chum, a co-worker, a relative, a family member, a spouse, a parent, a son or daughter...

And so began the War on Terror.

We soon learned about the Pentagon plane (which still has many mysteries surrounding it). And Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvainia, which dove for the ground when the passengers bravely tried to take back control. Flight 93 may have been heading for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, which is now called the Crane Clean Energy Center and which might be restarted to serve data centers...

And data centers are, more than anything else, being pushed for their usefulness in... fighting a modern war, or (hopefully...) having enough data to prevent its occurrence in the first place.

Or, if you're NOT one of the good guys, AI software running on massive data centers can be used to disrupt other data centers, or other infrastructure such as water desalination plants, pumping stations, filtration systems, communications systems, banking systems, industrial processes... and even for remotely destroying nuclear power plants.

And with zero-day coming (a still-theoretical moment when quantum-computing-AI can crack any known security system), nowhere is safe from infiltration, even places that were — at least in theory — previously safe from just about everything but a thermonuclear war.

Thus, we've ended up with a police state.

Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA

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Contact information for the author of this newsletter:

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company



Thursday, September 10, 2026

Comments due Sept. 10, 2026! NRC-2025-1139-0001 can hinder public comment and remove advisory committees

Comments on these proposed regulatory changes are due TODAY, September 10, 2026!

Go here to leave a comment with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2025-1139-0001

Below is what Sharon and I just posted a few minutes ago. (Comment Tracking Number: mtv-tp3p-l7uv )


The NRC describes this proposed rulemaking as non-controversial and plans to move directly to a final rule unless it receives " ... significant adverse comments ... ". (The final version of the rule has specific changes to 10 CFR, and is available here: https://www.regulations.gov/document/NRC-2025-1139-0002.)

It is generous to presume most of these changes are merely administrative. However, the wording of the rule doesn't make it clear what the actual impact of the changes will be, since, for example, "substantive" is an ambiguous term.

The final version of the rule has a long and detailed section devoted to "advisory committees" which is aimed at reducing the number and cost of such committees. What will the practical impact of such a change be for society, or the public, and for impacted individuals? The rulemaking does not make any of that clear, and leaves us with vague statements such as:

" ... changes are administrative and procedural in nature and do not introduce new substantive obligations for NRC licensees or other stakeholders ..."

" ... revisions affect terminology, chartering requirements, membership appointment processes, and reporting obligations ... "

Which advisory committees and advisors will be eliminated? Will the NRC be getting less input from industry organizations, such as the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), or from companies seeking nuclear licenses, or from experts in the field who do not have a vested interest? Numerous scientific studies support more-restrictive radiation standards — not less. Will support for that position be the first to be eliminated?

Similarly, the rulemaking changes the requirements for additional public comment periods after a rule is announced, because such comment periods were not actually required in some cases. (The NRC had made the requirement for these additional comment periods explicit in an 1985 amendment to 10 CFR, part 2.) The NRC explains the proposed reversal of that amendment by quoting the 1985 final rule which says: "The Commission normally provides for ... comment on policy statements and interpretive rules, and will continue to do so in the future."

However, it is not clear whether the entire 1985 amendment is being eliminated and therefore whether this vague reassurance has any weight. In addition, the underlying reasons for additional public comment periods are ignored in the new rule. How will making the extra comment period optional allow for exposing: " ... any errors or oversights that occurred in the formulation of the rule ... ” which was the intent or the 1985 change to 10 CFR part 2?

There is no discussion in the proposed rule changes for what might be lost by making current requirements for public comment periods discretionary. If the public had the opportunity to comment prior to this new rule — why shouldn't the rule specify that the NRC should give the public at least as much opportunity to comment as is currently available?

This change should be completely discarded.

Ace & Sharon Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA



Contact information for the author of this newsletter:

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, California USA
Author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Email: ace [at] acehoffman.org
Founder & Owner, The Animated Software Company