The Nuclear Waste Administration Act (H.R.9786): Don't be fooled by its apparent purpose!

by Sharon and Ace Hoffman
October 17, 2024

Representative Mike Levin is sponsoring bill H.R.9786 - Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2024 (hereafter NWAA 2024). The bill seeks to create a new federal agency called the “Nuclear Waste Administration” (hereafter NWA).

NWAA 2024 is a blatant attempt to circumvent the rules forbidding interim storage of nuclear waste until a permanent repository is established. Note the terminology: “pending completion” in the following quote from SEC. 102. Purposes:

“… to provide for one or more Federal storage facilities for nuclear waste pending completion of a repository …”

Levin’s bill ignores the fact that nobody, anywhere in the world, has a viable solution to storing nuclear waste for the millennia it will remain dangerous to living things. The only reasonable approach we’ve heard is rolling stewardship as described by Dr. Gordon Edwards:

1. Stop making more waste.

2. Store the existing waste in retrievable storage.

3. Plan to retrieve and repackage the waste on a regular basis.

4. When in doubt, refer back to #1.

Dr. Edwards anticipates that waste would be repackaged approximately every 10-20 years, and points out that the goal is preemptive maintenance, not waiting for a leak to contaminate the environment.

Levin’s bill proposes an entirely new government structure to “plan” for nuclear waste disposal. His bill will make it easier to license new nuclear plants, extend the licenses of existing plants, and reopen plants that have been closed such as Palisades and Three Mile Island.

The proposed new agency greatly increases the number of people whose jobs depend on nuclear power’s continued existence. Instead of two agencies (the NRC and the DOE) we will have three. Instead of one politically appointed commission (the five NRC commissioners) we’ll have two (the NWA will have its own 5-person Nuclear Waste Oversight Board).

Instead of acknowledging that the first step is to stop making more nuclear waste, Levin is misleading his local constituents, who desperately want to remove San Onofre’s spent nuclear fuel from the dangerous location it is currently at, on the Pacific coast in an earthquake zone. Perhaps Levin’s bill will succeed in removing San Onofre’s spent fuel, but only at the cost of allowing the continued creation of more nuclear waste. This is not just selfish, it is short-sighted.

All of the current attempts at “consent-based” nuclear waste storage translate directly to “Not In My Backyard” (“NIMBY”). People have recognized that NIMBYism is an elitist attitude since at least the 1970s, and should see Levin’s bill for what it is. (Despite this fiasco, we are in Levin’s district and will continue to vote for him, because the alternative candidate is much worse.)

NWAA 2024 also muddies the water concerning when a site can begin accepting waste. Consider the following from SEC. 103. Definitions:

“The term “emergency delivery” means nuclear waste accepted by the Administrator for storage prior to the date provided in the contractual delivery commitment schedule [and] may include, at the discretion of the Administrator, nuclear waste that is required to be removed from a Department of Energy facility … to eliminate an imminent and serious threat to the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security.”

Apparently, the Administrator of the new NWA will have the power to store nuclear waste outside of the terms of a legally-binding contract. What does that mean for the communities where the waste would be stored? This definition seems to allow the NWA to unilaterally move nuclear waste, from a DOE facility for instance, to a proposed consent-based site before a contract has even been signed.

NWAA 2024 also includes the following attempt to redefine spent fuel in SEC. 104. Rule of construction:

“The use of the term “nuclear waste” in this Act to mean high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel does not mean (and shall not be construed to mean) that spent nuclear fuel is, or should be, classified as or otherwise considered to be “waste” or “radioactive waste” for purposes of this Act or any other law, including the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) (commonly known as the “Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976”).”

One possible interpretation of these verbal gymnastics is an attempt to reclassify spent fuel so that it does not have to meet the requirements for storing radioactive waste, which is ridiculous. A more likely and far more dangerous interpretation is that spent fuel has some “useful” purpose and therefore is not waste. This obviously is referring to Plutonium 238 for nuclear weapons.

Bad as Levin’s bill is, we did not expect to find a hidden agenda aimed at encouraging reprocessing of spent fuel. President Carter banned reprocessing of spent fuel from commercial reactors in 1977. Although, this ban has been rescinded, there are currently no commercial reprocessing sites in the United States.

Nobody should be deceived by distinctions the bill tries to make between interim and permanent storage. The fine print of NWAA 2024 includes clear indications that the prohibitions against creating interim storage before a permanent repository exists will disappear as described in SEC. 306. Repositories:

“In selecting sites for site characterization as a repository, the Administrator shall give preference and priority to sites determined to be suitable for co-location of a storage facility and a repository.”

Reopening the entire question of where to site a “permanent repository” basically resets the clock and allows the nuclear industry to continue producing waste by pretending that at some (unknown) date in the future, the government will provide a way to store that waste. This is exactly how the false promise of Yucca Mountain enabled the nuclear industry for decades. While Yucca Mountain was the supposed solution, one of the rules governing scientific studies was that no other site could be considered. Levin’s bill will make all sites (with the possible exception of Yucca Mountain) eligible again and every attempt will be made to have the waste end up on Indigenous land.

Another concern with NWAA 2024 is who gets to decide where to put the waste. The bill repeatedly references three groups the NWA Administrator will need on his or her side:

* The Governor of the State in which the site is located

* The governing body of the affected unit of general local government

* The governing body of any affected Indian Tribe

We should be particularly worried about governors being considered as decision-makers in this context. Giving any governor this much power subverts the state government and potentially lets a very small number of people decide something that will impact everybody (including people outside the state that is the potential waste site).

The definition of “the affected unit of general local government” is also vague at best. Could this mean the mayor of a small town? The board of county supervisors? A homeowners association? A group of neighbors in an unincorporated area? What is the minimum number of people who can “approve” a nuclear waste site under this legislation?

NWAA 20224 also further blurs the line between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The following text is a red-flag that so-called commercial nuclear waste will be co-located with Defense Department waste. From SEC. 309. Defense waste:

“The Secretary [of Energy] shall arrange for the Administrator [of the NWA] to dispose of defense waste in a repository developed under this Act; and may arrange for the Administrator to store defense waste in storage facilities developed under this Act pending disposal in a repository. … The arrangements shall be covered by a memorandum of agreement between the Secretary [of Energy] and the Administrator [of the NWA].”

In case anybody is under the impression that a nuclear waste repository will be available soon, or that a waste disposal site anywhere could not impact people everywhere, consider the following text from SEC. 310. Transportation:

“The Administrator shall provide financial and technical assistance to a State or Indian Tribe … at least 5 years before the anticipated date on which the transport of nuclear waste through the jurisdiction of the State or Indian Tribe is to begin. ... monetary grants and contributions in-kind to assist States and Indian Tribes through whose jurisdiction the Administrator plans to transport nuclear waste for the purpose of acquiring equipment for responding to a transportation incident involving nuclear waste.”

Just what does it mean to provide equipment and training in case of a “transportation incident”? The nuclear industry has long ignored the reality that transportation accidents are inevitable, and clean-up is virtually impossible. What kind of equipment or training would be useful when a nuclear waste transport vehicle is trapped in a fire like the one that occurred in a Baltimore tunnel in 2001? What type of transport casks could survive a collapse such as the one that occurred on the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi River in 2007?

Even if the rest of Levin’s bill made sense, how long would it be before the first ounce of nuclear waste would be moved to a new site? Several decades seems like a very conservative estimate, and in the meantime, all the existing nuclear plants and new nuclear plants the government is determined to build will be producing more waste.

Levin’s bill, however, is confident that the NWA can do what nobody else has done in the past 80 years – find a place to safely store the waste, a technology to safely store the waste, and a way to safely move the waste as specified in SEC. 504. Mission plan:

“ ... operation of ... a storage facility not later than December 31, 2034; and a repository not later than December 31, 2060;”

NWAA 2024 mandates an operating interim storage facility in just over 10 years, and a permanent repository in less than 40 years. The initial date is obviously designed to convince people that nuclear power can play a role in meeting 2035 and 2050 climate-change milestones. The nuclear fuel cycle has no role in mitigating climate change. Furthermore, financial commitments to nuclear reduce available funding for clean energy technologies.

The bill’s timeline is unrealistic and ridiculous, but it’s also dangerous. The timeline enables the nuclear power and nuclear weapons industries to continue producing nuclear waste. It also lets the nuclear industry pretend there is a solution to an impossible problem and that the waste is a resource.

The very last section of NWAA 2024 tells us that Levin and his co-conspirators do not expect any limit to the production of nuclear waste. From SEC. 509. Application of volume limitation:

“The volume limitations described in the second and third sentences of section 114(d) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10134(d)) shall not apply to any repository to the extent that the consent agreement applicable to the repository provides for the disposal of a greater volume.”

The bill text is available here:

https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/9786/text/ih

World War III won't be nuclear...will it?

The answer is: It depends... It depends on who you ask. It depends on when you asked it. And it depends on what you meant by the question.

If you were listening to a broadcast from Tokyo in August, 1945, you wouldn't know what you were hearing. Nobody had ever dropped an atom bomb on anyone before. This is what Tokyo Radio reported after Hiroshima was bombed (right, top, from Fighter pilot Pierre Clostermann's 1952 book about WWII):

The horrors from the first two nuclear bombs were heavily censored for many years...

Eventually, even with knowledge of the horrors, nuclear war became normalized in the public's mind...even expected...

...and practiced. And studied. And America blew off over 1,000 nuclear bombs just so that, IF they ever got the chance to actually use one in war (again)... sometime... somewhere... they'd know the exact, or at least most probable, diameter of the fireball.

But that hasn't happened...at least, not yet.

No matter how much they practiced, they couldn't make "atomic" bombs big enough, so they made hydrogen bombs. Too big to explode on the continental United States (too many people would be shocked by how massive the blasts are, and many would have been directly impacted almost immediately by the radiation debris).

Ivy Mike was the first "full-scale" test of a thermonuclear device, or hydrogen bomb.

But bigger nuclear bombs weren't of any use in war anyway, and theatening them can't keep the peace either (it only caused Russia to explode the Czar Bomba, the largest thermonuclear device ever exploded at about 50 Megatons). Thermonuclear bombs are extremely filthy to test. Atmospheric testing was mostly halted in 1963, but "accidental" ("careless AND inevitable" is a much more appropriate description) venting of underground tests went on for decades afterwards. Testing continued by the United States until 1992, China and France until 1996, the Soviet Union until 1990 and the United Kingdom until 1991. Atmospheric tests by France ended in 1974. India and Pakistan haven't tested nuclear weapons since 1998. North Korea's last nuclear explosion was in 2017, by Donald Trump's bestie, Kim Jong-un, Supreme Leader of North Korea.

Some researchers realized that there was no place safe from nuclear war...which meant there were no safe nuclear installations of ANY sort...anywhere on earth.

But one thing could ALWAYS be said: The jobs paid well. And that worked out well for the nuclear navy, because they could promise their reactor operators high-paying jobs in the civilian nuclear industry after their tour of duty.

Unfortunately, their training didn't always apply, for example the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown was caused, in part, because civilian nuclear reactors do not operate precisely the same as naval reactors. (Briefly, so-called "commercial" nuclear reactors are built for peak efficiency at producing megawatts of electricity, and they can be shut down for refueling or maintenance whenever they can't operate at peak efficiency (or more accurately, at peak profit). The nuclear navy reactors -- especially the submarine reactors -- are desgined and built for steady operation under all circumstances, come hell or high water (so to speak), including war.)

But mistakes happen with distressing regularity in the nuclear industry -- as in any industry, but mistakes in the nuclear industry can result in much more serious consequences than anywhere else.

The U.S. Navy has lost two nuclear submarines at sea. (Russia has lost seven...so far.)

Everywhere we turn, and every time we turn around, there is another nuclear nightmare.

This is the world we've earned...by pushing nuclear solutions for ANYTHING all over the world and jumping the gun (so to speak) on their use in the first place.

The author I quote at the beginning of this post flew fighter planes in World War Two and saw the worst weapons could do in a pre-nuclear world. I have both his books, and wasn't expecting to find anything about nuclear bombs when suddenly I came upon the section quoted. In short, the bombs didn't win the war. Period.

Look at the difference between the development and use of laser weapons and our use of nuclear weapons. We've made absolutely no attempt to deploy laser weapons. Laser GUIDED weapons -- yes -- ever since they got hold of a workable aiming system they could combine with a heads-up display for the cockpit (since both are necessary to make the system work).

But NOT laser weapons, where the laser itself is the weapon.

Why not? Maybe because we know what a horror that would be for the world. Suddenly everybody would have them, and use them, and war would become even far more ghastly than it always has been. Just like what happened with nuclear weapons, except it hasn't quite happened yet: Various countries stockpile nuclear weapons, but no one dares to use them because everybody knows the most likely result. Chaos that nobody wins.

Laser weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons...everybody wants to leave them off the table. One would have thought exploding cell phones would have stayed off the table too. Can anyone trust their own phone or electric car not to be remotely exploded now?

Of course we've been assured those were special devices that had gunpowder in them (and I assume it's true), but we've all seen modern phone batteries expand...and nobody can know for sure. What will this do to the electric car market? If Israel manages to explode any of those, the whole world WILL rethink electric vehicles, as they are currently wondering about their phones.

The "brave new world" keeps becoming more and more challenging for sane people to navigate. As if gun violence in America isn't bad enough all by itself.

There are a lot of war hawks in government. But within the military itself, there is far greater caution, and undoubtedly a gut feeling that billions of dollars are wasted each year on weapons that should never be used under any reasonably foreseeable circumstances. And even in a "worst case scenario" we have far more nuclear weapons than needed for any job except total annihilation of the planet.

Claiming nuclear weapons won World War II was all propaganda. Everything about nuclear anything is propaganda. Nuclear weapons don't make us safe from attacks against our own nuclear facilities, which produce nuclear waste we have no solution for.

Ace Hoffman, Carlsbad, California USA October, 2024

Book Review: In Mortal Hands by Stephanie Cooke (2009)

In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age

by Stephanie Cooke

Reviewed by Sharon and Ace Hoffman

In Mortal Hands by Stephanie Cooke (published 2009) examines the history of nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the connection between the two.

Cooke has been reporting on nuclear energy and weapons since 1980; in this important book she delves deeply into the shady deals that led to the rise of nuclear power and the risks that had to be ignored in order to ensure its continued use in spite of all the financial, health, and/or other reasons that would have stopped any other industrial process. (And it's been another 15 years since the book came out, and three more meltdowns: By now every sane person on earth should know what a failure nuclear power is!)

In Mortal Hands was extensively researched and provides important context about how nuclear technologies are used and perceived worldwide, and thus, how we got where we are today.

Explaining how the Price-Anderson Act was pushed through Congress, Cooke points out that: “Since the early days of the Manhattan Project,...nuclear contractors such as Westinghouse and G.E. had insisted on full government liability coverage…”, and: “Some insurance executives wondered why Congress was even considering nuclear if the risks were so great.”

The result was the Price-Anderson Act (passed in 1957), which protects utilities and their insurers from all but a small fraction of total liability, and protects the government as well. It leaves the citizens to loose their homes, their belongings, and their lives.

In Mortal Hands explores incidents where safety concerns were ignored or hidden from potential victims. For example, in the wake of the partial test-ban treaty, the U.S. continued underground testing in Nevada. Cooke writes that: “In one venting episode in 1964...Seaborg [Glenn Seaborg, then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission] believed a small amount of radioactivity had crossed into Mexico, but the planes were not allowed...to find out”. When radioactive contamination was found in U.S. milk just 10 miles from Mexico: “there is no public evidence that anything was done to prevent children from drinking the milk.”

Cooke covers many nuclear “accidents” and the associated efforts to minimize their impact on nuclear ambitions. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Sellafield (aka Windscale, in Great Britain), the near-meltdown of the Fermi I breeder reactor near Detroit, the B-52s that crashed in Spain and Greenland and many other incidents are analyzed (the book was written prior to Fukushima). In each case, there is extensive documentation of what happened versus what the public was told. The government(s) involved invariably would attempt to minimize any perceived risk from the event (if they couldn't hide it from the public completely).

The book has sections on the Cuban Missile Crisis and other Cold War conflicts between Russia and the United States. Cooke pays particular attention to the political repercussions of any attempt to limit nuclear weapons. For example: “… the limited test ban treaty...only made it through after the defense lobby extracted concessions to ensure a robust future for the vast research and development complex.”

The entire nuclear industry is a gigantic money suck, in addition to its health consequences.

In Mortal Hands focuses on the similarities and connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Cooke writes that: “The failure to adequately address the complexity of reactor operating systems in order to prevent nuclear accidents is analogous to the inability of governments and industry to prevent nuclear proliferation.” Mistakes happen, and have nearly caused nuclear war on several occasions, and have nearly caused meltdowns countless times, and, of course, were also involved in every meltdown that has already occurred.

Cooke continually points out accommodations governments made to encourage nuclear power investments: “People who genuinely worried about safety, like those who concerned themselves with proliferation, also faced formidable political and commercial obstacles. Utilities in a hurry to...maximize profits...brought pressure to bear on regulators and...safety concerns were shunted to the side.” And accidents happened.

Cooke is clear that most (if not all) of the decisions that governments have made about nuclear power are politically motivated. For example, during the 1976 U.S. presidential election, both Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford used nuclear proliferation and its ties to nuclear power in attempts to advance their political goals. Neither even remotely suggested eliminating nuclear power.

Carter was from the nuclear navy and promoted himself as an expert, and raised many potential dangers, such as terrorists stealing plutonium. However, his proposed solution was vague: “U.S. dependence on nuclear power should be kept to the minimum necessary to meet our needs.” Ford countered by announcing a similarly incomplete ban on reprocessing: “…unless there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.”

Of course, time has proven the risks insurmountable so far, and the threat of nuclear war (including attacks on nuclear power plants) remains. Meltdowns keep happening and close calls go largely unreported.

In Mortal Hands encapsulates decades of research and conversations Cooke personally had with participants in many different aspects of the nuclear industry, including both military and commercial applications. Reading the books now, 15 years after it was published, gives one the opportunity to see how things went so wrong in the past, and how completely nuclear power and nuclear weapons depend on each other to continue to threaten humanity.

All quotes are from In Mortal Hands. In some cases, they may reference footnotes or quotes attributed to a specific person.

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